sed than in the offensive, since when a position is to
be carried it can be accomplished only by moving upon it, and
marching and firing at the same time can be done only by troops as
skirmishers, being an impossibility for the principal masses. The
object of the defense being to break and throw into confusion the
troops advancing to the attack, the fire of artillery and musketry
will be the natural defensive means of the first line, and when the
enemy presses too closely the columns of the second line and part
of the cavalry must be launched against him. There will then be a
strong probability of his repulse.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 24: In every battle one party must be the assailant and the
other assailed. Every battle is hence offensive for one party and
defensive for the other.]

[Footnote 25: The letter A in this and other figures of the twelve
orders indicates the defensive army, and B the offensive. The armies are
represented each in a single line, in order not to complicate the
figures too much; but it should be observed that every order of battle
ought to be in two lines, whether the troops are deployed in columns of
attack, in squares, or checkerwise.]

[Footnote 26: An attack upon the two extremities might succeed also in
some cases, either when the force was strong enough to try it, or the
enemy was unable to weaken his center to support the wings. As a rule, a
false attack to engage the center, and a strong attack against one
extremity, would be the best method to use against such a line.]

[Footnote 27: The great reserves must, of course, be also engaged when
it is necessary; but it is always a good plan to keep back, as a final
reserve, two or three battalions and five or six squadrons. Moreau
decided the battle of Engen with four companies of infantry; and what
Kellermann's cavalry accomplished at Marengo is known to every reader of
history.]

ARTICLE XXXII.

Turning Maneuvers, and too extended Movement in Battles.

We have spoken in the preceding article of maneuvers undertaken to turn
an enemy's line upon the battle-field, and of the advantages which may
be expected from them. A few words remain to be said as to the wide
detours which these maneuvers sometimes occasion, causing the failure of
so many plans seemingly well arranged.

It may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous which
is so extended as to give the enemy