an opportunity, while it is taking
place, of beating the remainder of the army in position. Nevertheless,
as the danger depends very much upon the rapid and certain _coup-d'oeil_
of the opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which
he is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so many
maneuvers of this kind have failed against some commanders and succeeded
against others, and why such a movement which would have been hazardous
in presence of Frederick, Napoleon, or Wellington might have entire
success against a general of limited capacity, who had not the tact to
take the offensive himself at the proper moment, or who might himself
have been in the habit of moving in this manner.

It seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the subject.
The following directions are all that can be given. Keep the mass of the
force well in hand and ready to act at the proper moment, being careful,
however, to avoid the danger of accumulating troops in too large bodies.
A commander observing these precautions will be always prepared for any
thing that may happen. If the opposing general shows little skill and
seems inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may be
more daring.

A few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the reader of
the truth of my statements, and to show him how the results of these
extended movements depend upon the characters of the generals and the
armies concerned in them.

In the Seven Years' War, Frederick gained the battle of Prague because
the Austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards
between their right and the remainder of their army,--the latter part
remaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. This inaction was
the more extraordinary as the left of the Austrians had a much shorter
distance to pass over in order to support their right than Frederick had
to attack it; for the right was in the form of a crotchet, and Frederick
was obliged to move on the arc of a large semicircle to reach it.

On the other hand, Frederick came near losing the battle of Torgau,
because he made with his left a movement entirely too extended and
disconnected (nearly six miles) with a view of turning the right of
Marshal Daun.[28] Mollendorf brought up the right by a concentric
movement to the heights of Siptitz, where he rejoined the king, whose
line was thus reformed.

The battle of Rivoli is a noted instance in point. Al