inly take place;
and, if the assailant has an accurate knowledge of the locality and can
give a suitable tactical and strategic direction to the mass of his
forces, he may expect a complete success, unless unforeseen events
occur. This is an operation by no means to be despised in war, although
it is rare, and less brilliant than a great strategic combination which
renders the victory certain even before the battle is fought.

For the same reason that advantage should be taken of all opportunities
for surprising an adversary, the necessary precautions should be used to
prevent such attacks. The regulations for the government of any
well-organized army should point out the means for doing the last.

ARTICLE XXXV.

Of the Attack by Main Force of Fortified Places, Intrenched Camps or
Lines.--Of Coups de Main in General.

There are many fortified places which, although not regular fortresses,
are regarded as secure against _coups de main_, but may nevertheless be
carried by escalade or assault, or through breaches not altogether
practicable, but so steep as to require the use of ladders or some other
means of getting to the parapet.

The attack of a place of this kind presents nearly the same combinations
as that of an intrenched camp; for both belong to the class of _coups de
main_.

This kind of attack will vary with circumstances: 1st, with the strength
of the works; 2d, with the character of the ground on which they are
built; 3d, with the fact of their being isolated or connected; 4th, with
the morale of the respective parties. History gives us examples of all
of these varieties.

For examples, take the intrenched camps of Kehl, Dresden, and Warsaw,
the lines of Turin and Mayence, the intrenchments of Feldkirch,
Scharnitz, and Assiette. Here I have mentioned several cases, each with
varying circumstances and results. At Kehl (1796) the intrenchments were
better connected and better constructed than at Warsaw. There was, in
fact, a _tete de pont_ nearly equal to a permanent fortification; for
the archduke thought himself obliged to besiege it in form, and it would
have been extremely hazardous for him to make an open attack upon it. At
Warsaw the works were isolated, but of considerable relief, and they had
as a keep a large city surrounded by loopholed walls, armed and defended
by a number of desperate men.

Dresden, in 1813, had for a keep a bastioned enceinte, one front of
which, however, was disman