cable. These figures
have never been of any other use than to indicate approximate
arrangements.

If every army were a solid mass, capable of motion as a unit under the
influence of one man's will and as rapidly as thought, the art of
winning battles would be reduced to choosing the most favorable order of
battle, and a general could reckon with certainty upon the success of
maneuvers arranged beforehand. But the facts are altogether different;
for the great difficulty of the tactics of battles will always be to
render certain the simultaneous entering into action of the numerous
fractions whose efforts must combine to make such an attack as will give
good ground to hope for victory: in other words, the chief difficulty is
to cause these fractions to unite in the execution of the decisive
maneuver which, in accordance with the original plan of the battle, is
to result in victory.

Inaccurate transmission of orders, the manner in which they will be
understood and executed by the subordinates of the general-in-chief,
excess of activity in some, lack of it in others, a defective
_coup-d'oeil militaire_,--every thing of this kind may interfere with
the simultaneous entering into action of the different parts, without
speaking of the accidental circumstances which may delay or prevent the
arrival of a corps at the appointed place.

Hence result two undoubted truths: 1. The more simple a decisive
maneuver is, the more sure of success will it be; 2. Sudden maneuvers
seasonably executed during an engagement are more likely to succeed than
those determined upon in advance, unless the latter, relating to
previous strategic movements, will bring up the columns which are to
decide the day upon those points where their presence will secure the
expected result. Waterloo and Bautzen are proofs of the last. From the
moment when Bluecher and Bulow had reached the heights of Frichermont,
nothing could have prevented the loss of the battle by the French, and
they could then only fight to make the defeat less complete. In like
manner, at Bautzen, as soon as Ney had reached Klix, the retreat of the
allies during the night of the 20th of May could alone have saved them,
for on the 21st it was too late; and, if Ney had executed better what
he was advised to do, the victory would have been a very great one.

As to maneuvers for breaking through a line and calculations upon the
co-operation of columns proceeding from the general front of th