reatest events of history.
Every army which maintains a strictly defensive attitude must, if
attacked, be at last driven from its position; whilst by profiting by
all the advantages of the defensive system, and holding itself ready to
take the offensive when occasion offers, it may hope for the greatest
success. A general who stands motionless to receive his enemy, keeping
strictly on the defensive, may fight ever so bravely, but he must give
way when properly attacked. It is not so, however, with a general who
indeed waits to receive his enemy, but with the determination to fall
upon him offensively at the proper moment, to wrest from him and
transfer to his own troops the moral effect always produced by an onward
movement when coupled with the certainty of throwing the main strength
into the action at the most important point,--a thing altogether
impossible when keeping strictly on the defensive. In fact, a general
who occupies a well-chosen position, where his movements are free, has
the advantage of observing the enemy's approach; his forces, previously
arranged in a suitable manner upon the position, aided by batteries
placed so as to produce the greatest effect, may make the enemy pay very
dearly for his advance over the space separating the two armies; and
when the assailant, after suffering severely, finds himself strongly
assailed at the moment when the victory seemed to be in his hands, the
advantage will, in all probability, be his no longer, for the moral
effect of such a counter-attack upon the part of an adversary supposed
to be beaten is certainly enough to stagger the boldest troops.

A general may, therefore, employ in his battles with equal success
either the offensive or defensive system; but it is indispensable,--1st,
that, so far from limiting himself to a passive defense, he should know
how to take the offensive at favorable moments; 2d, that his
_coup-d'oeil_ be certain and his coolness undoubted; 3d, that he be able
to rely surely upon his troops; 4th, that, in retaking the offensive, he
should by no means neglect to apply the general principle which would
have regulated his order of battle had he done so in the beginning; 5th,
that he strike his blows upon decisive points. These truths are
demonstrated by Napoleon's course at Rivoli and Austerlitz, as well as
by Wellington's at Talavera, at Salamanca, and at Waterloo.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 22: It is from no desire to make innovations that I h