t would be out of place here to go into details as to the sites of
ordinary camps and upon the means of covering them by advanced guards,
or upon the advantages of field-fortifications in the defense of posts.
Only fortified camps enter into the combinations of grand tactics, and
even of strategy; and this they do by the temporary support they afford
an army.

It may be seen by the example of the camp of Buntzelwitz, which saved
Frederick in 1761, and by those of Kehl and Dusseldorf in 1796, that
such a refuge may prove of the greatest importance. The camp of Ulm, in
1800, enabled Kray to arrest for a whole month the army of Moreau on
the Danube; and Wellington derived great advantages from his camp of
Torres-Vedras. The Turks were greatly assisted in defending the country
between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains by the camp of Shumla.

The principal rule in this connection is that camps should be
established on strategic points which should also possess tactical
advantages. If the camp of Drissa was useless to the Russians in 1812,
it was because it was not in a proper position in reference to their
defensive system, which should have rested upon Smolensk and Moscow.
Hence the Russians were compelled to abandon it after a few days.

The maxims which have been given for the determination of the great
decisive strategic points will apply to all intrenched camps, because
they ought only to be placed on such points. The influence of these
camps is variable: they may answer equally well as points of departure
for an offensive operation, as _tetes de ponts_ to assure the crossing
of a large river, as protection for winter quarters, or as a refuge for
a defeated army.

However good may be the site of such a camp, it will always be difficult
to locate it so that it may not be turned, unless, like the camp of
Torres-Vedras, it be upon a peninsula backed by the sea. Whenever it can
be passed either by the right or the left, the army will be compelled to
abandon it or run the risk of being invested in it. The camp of Dresden
was an important support to Napoleon for two months; but as soon as it
was outflanked by the allies it had not the advantages even of an
ordinary fortress; for its extent led to the sacrifice of two corps
within a few days for want of provisions.

Despite all this, these camps, when only intended to afford temporary
support to an army on the defensive, may still fulfill this end, even
when the enemy p