rruption at
home, and which must have injuriously influenced the political
growth of the Spanish-American Republics. Firmly seated in Mexico,
it would have spread through Central America to the Isthmus,
controlling all canal communications between the two oceans which
were the boundaries of the Union, while its growth upon the Pacific
Coast would have been in direct rivalry with the natural and
increasing power of the United States. Commanding the Gulf of
Mexico it would have controlled the whole commerce of the West-
Indian islands and radically changed their future. Bound by dynastic
connection, checked and directed by European influence, it could
not have developed a national policy in harmony with neighboring
States, but its existence and its necessary efforts at expansion
would have made it not only a constant menace to American Republics
but a source of endless war and confusion between the great Powers
of the world. The policy signally failed. But surely European
statesmen, without miraculous foresight, might have anticipated
that its success would have been more dangerous than its defeat,
and that the conservative strength of the Union might be even to
them an influence of good and not of evil.

FORMER VIEWS OF LORD PALMERSTON.

In 1859 Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord John Russell: "It is plain
that France aims through Spain at getting fortified points on each
side of the Gut of Gibraltar which in the event of war between
Spain and France on the one hand and England on the other would by
a cross fire render that strait very difficult and dangerous to
pass and thus virtually shut us out of the Mediterranean. . . .
The French Minister of War or of marine said the other day that
Algeria never would be safe till France possessed a port on the
Atlantic coast of Africa. Against whom would such a port make
Algeria safe? Evidently only against England, and how could such
a port help France against England? Only by tending to shut us
out of the Mediterranean." Later in the same year writing to the
same colleague, he says, "Till lately I had strong confidence in
the fair intentions of Napoleon towards England, but of late I have
begun to feel great distrust and to suspect that his formerly
declared intention of avenging Waterloo has only lain dormant and
has not died away. He seems to have thought that he ought to lay
his foundation by beating with our aid or with our