ys," 242.)

he says, the gods do these things, that the wicked being punished,
others admonished by these examples may less dare to attempt the doing
of such things.

Again, in his book of Justice, subjoining, that it is possible for those
who make pleasure a good but not the end to preserve also justice, he
said in express terms: "For perhaps if we leave this to pleasure, that
it is a good but not the end, and that honesty is one of those things
which are eligible for themselves, we may preserve justice, making the
honest and the just a greater good than pleasure." So much he says in
this place concerning pleasure. But in his book against Plato, accus
temperance, and all the other virtues will be taken away, if we make
pleasure, health, or anything else which is not honest, to be a good.
What therefore is to be said for Plato, we have elsewhere written
against him. But here his contradicting himself is manifest, when he
says in one place, that if a man supposes that with honesty pleasure
also is a good, justice is preserved, and in another, accuses those
who make anything besides honesty to be a good of taking away all the
virtues. But that he may not leave any means of making an apology for
his contradictions, writing against Aristotle concerning justice, he
affirms him not to have spoken rightly when he said, that pleasure being
made the end, justice is taken away, and together with justice, every
one also of the other virtues. For justice (he says) will indeed be
taken away; but there is nothing to hinder the other virtues from
remaining and being, though not eligible for themselves, yet good and
virtues. Then he reckons up every one of them by name. But it will be
better to set down his own words. "For pleasure," says he, "appearing
according to this discourse to be made the end, yet all this seems not
to me to be contained in it. Wherefore we must say, that neither any of
the virtues is eligible nor any of the vices to be avoided for itself,
but that all these things are to be referred to the proposed scope. Yet
nothing, according to their opinion, will hinder but that fortitude,
prudence, continence, and patience may be good, and their contraries
to be avoided." Has there ever then been any man more peevish in his
disputes than he, who has blamed two of the principal philosophers, the
one for taking away all virtue, by not making that only to be good which
is honest, and the other for not thinking all the virtue