r sentiments nor have
utility by Fate, but that there is an end of Fate's being the cause of
all things. Now if any one shall say that Chrysippus makes not Fate the
absolute cause of all things, but only a PROCATARCLICAL (or antecedent)
one, he will again show that he is contradictory to himself, since he
excessively praises Homer for saying of Jupiter,

Receive whatever good or ill
He sends to each of you;

as also Euripides for these words,

O Jove, how can I say that wretched we,
Poor mortals, aught do understand? On thee
We all depend, and nothing can transact,
But as thy sacred wisdom shall enact.
(Euripides, "Suppliants," 734.)

And himself writes many things agreeable to these. In fine, he says that
nothing, be it never so little, either rests or is moved otherwise than
according to the reason of Jupiter, which is the same thing with Fate.
Moreover, the antecedent cause is weaker than the absolute one, and
attains not to its effect when it is subdued by others that rise
up against it. But he himself declaring Fate to be an invincible,
unimpeachable, and inflexible cause, calls it Atropos, (That is,
Unchangeable.) Adrasteia, (That is, Unavoidable.) Necessity, and
Pepromene (as putting a limit to all things). Whether then shall we say,
that neither consents nor virtues nor vices nor doing well nor doing
ill is in our power? Or shall we affirm, that Fate is deficient, that
terminating destiny is unable to determine, and that the motions
and habits of Jupiter cannot be effective? For the one of these two
consequences will follow from Fate's being an absolute, the other from
its being only an antecedent cause. For if it is an absolute cause, it
takes away our free will and leaves nothing in our control; and if it is
only antecedent, it loses its being unimpeachable and effectual. For
not once or ten times, but everywhere, especially in his Physics, he
has written, that there are many obstacles and impediments to particular
natures and motions, but none to that of the universe. And how can the
motion of the universe, extending as it does to particular ones, be
undisturbed and unimpeached, if these are stopped and hindered? For
neither can the nature of man be free from impediment, if that of the
foot or hand is not so; nor can the motion of a ship but be hindered, if
there are any obstacles about the sails or the operation of the oars.

Besides all this, if the fantasies are n