assigning to them the least causes, he takes from them
the most principal and greatest. For what is more principal than the
permanency of the world, or that its essence, united in its parts, is
contained in itself? But this, as Chrysippus says, fell out casually.
For if the possession of place is the cause of incorruptibility, and
this was the production of chance, it is manifest that the preservation
of the universe is a work of chance, and not of Fate and Providence.

Now, as for his doctrine of possibles, how can it but be repugnant to
his doctrine of Fate? For if that is not possible which either is true
or shall be true, as Diodorus has it, but everything which is capable of
being, though it never shall be, is possible, there will be many things
possible which will never be according to invincible, inviolable, and
all-conquering Fate. And thus either Fate will lose its power; or if
that, as Chrysippus thinks, has existence, that which is susceptible of
being will often fall out to be impossible. And everything indeed which
is true will be necessary, being comprehended by the principal of all
necessities; and everything that is false will be impossible, having
the greatest cause to oppose its ever being true. For how is it possible
that he should be susceptible of dying on the land, who is destined to
die at sea? And how is it possible for him who is at Megara to come to
Athens, if he is prohibited by Fate?

But moreover, the things that are boldly asserted by him concerning
fantasies or imaginations are very opposite to Fate. For desiring to
show that fantasy is not of itself a perfect cause of consent, he says,
that the Sages will prejudice us by imprinting false imaginations in our
minds, if fantasies do of themselves absolutely cause consent; for
wise men often make use of falsity against the wicked, representing a
probable imagination,--which is yet not the cause of consent, for
then it would be also a cause of false apprehension and error. Any one
therefore, transferring these things from the wise man to Fate, may say,
that consents are not caused by Fate; for if they were, false consents
and opinions and deceptions would also be by Fate. Thus the reason which
exempts the wise man from doing hurt also demonstrates at the same time
that Fate is not the cause of all things. For if men neither opine
nor are prejudiced by Fate, it is manifest also that they neither
act rightly nor are wise nor remain firm in thei