; and that the motions are adulteries, thefts, treasons,
murders, parricides. Of these Chrysippus thinks, that no one, either
little or great, is contrary to the reason of Jupiter, or to his law,
justice, and providence; so neither is the transgressing of the law
done against the law, nor the acting unjustly against justice, nor the
committing of sin against Providence.

And yet he says, that God punishes vice, and does many things for the
chastising of the wicked. And in his Second Book of the Gods he says,
that many adversities sometimes befall the good, not as they do the
wicked, for punishment, but according to another dispensation, as it
is in cities. And again in these words: "First we are to understand of
evils in like manner as has been said before: then that these things are
distributed according to the reason of Jupiter, whether for punishment,
or according to some other dispensation, having in some sort respect to
the universe." This therefore is indeed severe, that wickedness is both
done and punished according to the reason of Jupiter. But he aggravates
this contradiction in his Second Book of Nature, writing thus: "Vice in
reference to grievous accidents, has a certain reason of its own. For it
is also in some sort according to the reason of Nature, and, as I may
so say, is not wholly useless in respect of the universe. For otherwise
also there would not be any good." Thus does he reprehend those that
dispute indifferently on both sides, who, out of a desire to say
something wholly singular and more exquisite concerning everything,
affirms, that men do not unprofitably cut purses, calumniate, and play
madmen, and that it is not unprofitable there should be unprofitable,
hurtful, and unhappy persons. What manner of god then is Jupiter,--I
mean Chrysippus's Jupiter,--who punishes an act done neither willingly
nor unprofitably? For vice is indeed, according to Chrysippus's
discourse, wholly reprehensible; but Jupiter is to be blamed, whether
he has made vice which is an unprofitable thing, or, having made it not
unprofitable, punishes it.

Again, in his First Book of Justice, having spoken of the gods as
resisting the injustices of some, he says: "But wholly to take away
vice is neither possible nor expedient." Whether it were not better
that law-breaking, injustice, and folly should be taken away, is not the
design of this present discourse to inquire. But he himself, as much
as in him lies, by his philosop