which is named the argument against destiny, they are indeed
but vain subtleties and captious sophisms, according to this discourse.
But according to the contrary opinion, the first and principal
conclusion seems to be, that there is nothing done without a cause,
but that all things depend upon antecedent causes; the second, that the
world is governed by Nature, and that it conspires, consents, and is
compatible with itself; the third seems rather to be testimonies,--of
which the first is divination, approved by all sorts of people, as being
truly in God; the second is the equanimity and patience of wise men, who
take mildly and bear patiently whatever befalls, as happening by divine
ordinance and as it ought; the third is the speech so common and usual
in every one's mouth, to wit, that every proposition is true or false.
Thus have we contracted this discourse into a small number of short
articles, that we might in few words comprehend the whole matter of
Fate; into which a scrutiny ought to be made, and the reasons of both
opinions to be weighed with a most exact balance. But we shall come to
discuss particulars later.

END OF NINE-----------

AGAINST COLOTES, THE DISCIPLE AND FAVORITE OF EPICURUS.

COLOTES, whom Epicurus was wont diminutively and by way of familiarity
or fondness to call Colotaras and Colotarion, composed, O Saturninus,
and published a little book which he entitled, "That according to the
opinions of the other philosophers one cannot so much as live." This was
dedicated to King Ptolemy. Now I suppose that it will not be unpleasant
for you to read, when set down in writing, what came into my mind
to speak against this Colotes, since I know you to be a lover of all
elegant and honest treatises, and particularly of such as regard the
science of antiquity, and to esteem the bearing in memory and having (as
much as possible may be) in hand the discourses of the ancient sages to
be the most royal of all studies and exercises.

Not long since, therefore, as this book was being read, Aristodemus of
Aegium, a familiar friend of ours (whom you well know to be one of the
Academy, and not a mere thyrsus-bearer, but one of the most frantic
celebrators of Plato's name), did, I know not how, keep himself contrary
to his custom very still all the while, and patiently gave ear to it
even to the end. But the reading was scarce well over when he said:
Well, then, whom shall we cause to rise up and fight aga