s except justice
to be preserved, though pleasure is made the end? For it is a wonderful
licentiousness that, discoursing of the same matters, he should when
accusing Plato take away again those very things which himself sets down
when reprehending Aristotle. Moreover, in his demonstrations concerning
justice, he says expressly, that every good deed is both a lawful action
and a just operation; but that everything which is done according
to continence, patience, prudence, or fortitude is a good deed, and
therefore also a just operation. Why, then, does he not also leave
justice to them to whom he leaves prudence, fortitude, and continence;
since whatever they do well according to the said virtue, they do also
justly?

Moreover, Plato having said, that injustice, as being the corruption
and sedition of the soul, loses not its power even in those who have it
within them, but sets the wicked man against himself, and molests and
disturbs him; Chrysippus, blaming this, affirms that it is absurdly
said, "A man injures himself"; for that injustice is to another, and not
to one's self. But forgetting this, he again says, in his demonstrations
concerning justice, that the unjust man is injured by himself and
injures himself when he injures another, becoming to himself the cause
of transgressing, and undeservedly hurting himself. In his books indeed
against Plato, contending that we cannot talk of injustice against one's
self, but as concerns another, he has these words: "For men cannot be
unjust by themselves; injustice requires several on different sides,
speaking contrary one unto another and the injustice must be taken in
different ways. But no such thing extends to one alone, except inasmuch
as he is affected towards his neighbor." But in his demonstrations
he has such discourses as these, concerning the unjust man's being
injurious also to himself: "The law forbids the being any way the
author of transgression, and to act unjustly will be transgression. He
therefore who is to himself the author of acting unjustly transgresses
against himself. Now he that transgresses against any one also injures
him; therefore he who is injurious to any one whomsoever is injurious
also to himself." Again: "Sin is a hurt, and every one who sins
sins against himself; every one therefore who sins hurts himself
undeservedly, and if so, is also unjust to himself." And farther thus:
"He who is hurt by another hurts himself, and that undeservedly.