ommand him.
For there is not any law or ordinance more worthy and powerful than
knowledge; nor is it suitable that Mind, provided it be truly and really
free by Nature, should be a subject or slave to any one, but it ought to
command all." (Plato, "Laws," ix. p.875 C.)

I therefore do for mine own part thus understand and interpret this
sentence of Plato. There being a threefold Providence, the first, as
having engendered Fate, does in some sort comprehend it; the second,
having been engendered with Fate, is with it totally comprehended and
embraced by the first; the third, as having been engendered after Fate,
is comprehended by it in the same manner as are free choice and Fortune,
as we have already said. "For they whom the assistance of a Daemon's
power does help in their intercourse" says Socrates, declaring to
Theages what is the almost settled ordinance of Adrastea "are those whom
you also mean; for they advance quickly." (Plato, "Theages", p.129 E.)
In which words, what he says of a Daemon's aiding some is to be ascribed
to the third Providence, and the growing and coming forward with speed
to Fate. In brief, it is not obscure or doubtful but that this also is
a kind of Fate. And perhaps it may be found much more probable that the
second Providence is also comprehended under Fate, and indeed all things
that are done; since Fate, as a substance, has been rightly divided
by us into three parts, and the simile of the chain comprehends the
revolutions of the heavens in the number and rank of those things
which happen conditionally. But concerning these things I will not much
contend, to wit, whether they should be called conditional, or rather
conjoined with Fate, the precedent cause and commander of Fate being
also fatal.

Our opinion, then, to speak briefly, is such. But the contrary sentiment
not only places all things in Fate, but affirms them all to be done by
Fate. It agrees indeed in all things to the other (the Stoic) doctrine;
and that which accords to another thing, 'tis clear, is the same with
it. In this discourse therefore we have first spoken of the contingent;
secondly, of "that which is in our power"; thirdly, of Fortune and
chance, and whatever depends on them; fourthly, of praise, blame, and
whatever depends on them; the fifth and last of all may be said to be
prayers to the gods, with their services and ceremonies.

For the rest, as to those which are called idle and cropping arguments,
and that