FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   395   396   397   398   399   400   401   402   403   404   405   406   407   408   409   410   411   412   413   414   415   416   417   418   419  
420   421   422   423   424   425   426   427   428   429   430   431   432   433   434   435   436   437   438   439   440   441   442   443   444   >>   >|  
his colors; because the law has virtually--though not in express terms and particularly yet in such general ones as they are comprehended under,--so determined of them. As the law (if I may so speak) of physicians and masters of corporal exercises potentially comprehends particular and special things within the general; so the law of Nature, determining first and principally general matters, secondarily and subordinately determines such as are particular. Thus, general things being decreed by Fate, particular and individual things may also in some sort be said to be so, because they are so by consequence with the general. But perhaps some one of those who more accurately examine and more subtly search into these things may say, on the contrary, that particular and individual things precede the composition of general things, and that the general exist only for the particular, since that for which another thing is always goes before that which is for it. Nevertheless, this is not the proper place to treat of this difficulty, but it is to be remitted to another. However, that Fate comprehends not all things clearly and expressly, but only such as are universal and general, let it pass for resolved on at present, as well for what we have already said a little before, as for what we shall say hereafter. For that which is finite and determinate, agreeing properly with divine Providence, is seen more in universal and general things than in particular; such therefore is the divine law, and also the civil; but infinity consists in particulars and individuals. After this we are to declare what this term "conditionally" means; for it is to be thought that Fate is also some such thing. That, then, is said to be conditionally, which is supposed to exist not of itself or absolutely, but as really dependent upon and joined to another; which signifies a suit and consequence. "And this is the sanction of Adrastea (or an inevitable ordinance), that whatever soul, being an attendant on God, shall see anything of truth, shall till another revolution be exempt from punishment; and if it is ever able to do the same, it shall never suffer any damage." This is said both conditionally and also universally. Now that Fate is some such thing is clearly manifest, as well from its substance as from its name. For it is called [Greek omitted] as being [Greek omitted], that is, dependent and linked; and it is a sanction or law, because things are ther
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   395   396   397   398   399   400   401   402   403   404   405   406   407   408   409   410   411   412   413   414   415   416   417   418   419  
420   421   422   423   424   425   426   427   428   429   430   431   432   433   434   435   436   437   438   439   440   441   442   443   444   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

general

 

things

 

conditionally

 
sanction
 
divine
 

omitted

 

universal

 
consequence
 

dependent

 

individual


comprehends

 

individuals

 

consists

 
infinity
 

punishment

 

particulars

 

declare

 
exempt
 

thought

 
called

properly

 
agreeing
 

determinate

 

linked

 
Providence
 

finite

 

inevitable

 

Adrastea

 

ordinance

 

attendant


universally

 

signifies

 

joined

 

manifest

 
revolution
 

substance

 
damage
 
suffer
 
absolutely
 

supposed


expressly

 

matters

 

secondarily

 
subordinately
 

principally

 

Nature

 

determining

 
determines
 

virtually

 
decreed