uccessfully to explain,--that of a state above
mankind, a moral condition "beyond man," as he calls it,--that is worth
talking about. It is not nonsense at all, but fact, and I think that I can
give you a correct idea of the realities in the case. Leaving Nietzsche
entirely alone, then, let us ask if it is possible to suppose a condition
of human existence above morality,--that is to say, more moral than the
most moral ideal which a human brain can conceive? We may answer, it is
quite possible, and it is not only possible, but it has actually been
predicted by many great thinkers, including Herbert Spencer.

We have been brought up to think that there can be nothing better than
virtue, than duty, than strictly following the precepts of a good
religion. However, our ideas of goodness and of virtue necessarily imply
the existence of the opposite qualities. To do a good thing because it is
our duty to do it, implies a certain amount of resolve, a struggle against
difficulty. The virtue of honesty is a term implying the difficulty of
being perfectly honest. When we think of any virtuous or great deed, we
can not help thinking of the pain and obstacles that have to be met with
in performing that deed. All our active morality is a struggle against
immorality. And I think that, as every religion teaches, it must be
granted that no human being has a perfectly moral nature.

Could a world exist in which the nature of all the inhabitants would be so
moral that the mere idea of what is immoral could not exist? Let me
explain my question more in detail. Imagine a society in which the idea of
dishonesty would not exist, because no person could be dishonest, a
society in which the idea of unchastity could not exist, because no person
could possibly be unchaste, a world in which no one could have any idea of
envy, ambition or anger, because such passions could not exist, a world in
which there would be no idea of duty, filial or parental, because not to
be filial, not to be loving, not to do everything which we human beings
now call duty, would be impossible. In such a world ideas of duty would be
quite useless; for every action of existence would represent the constant
and faultless performance of what we term duty. Moreover, there would be
no difficulty, no pain in such performance; it would be the constant and
unfailing pleasure of life. With us, unfortunately, what is wrong often
gives pleasure; and what is good to do, commonly cau