ss of inquiry, we must next ask:
(1) under what conditions do they pass over into this process of
inquiry? (2) what modifications of operation do they undergo, what new
forms do they take, and what new results do they produce in their
logical operations?

If the act of inquiry be not superimposed, it must arise out of some
specific condition in the course of non-logical conduct. Once more, if
the alarm be sounded at this proposal to find the origin of logical in
non-logical operations it must be summarily answered by asking if the
one who raises the cry finds it impossible to imagine that one who is
not hungry, or angry, or patriotic, or wise may become so. Non-logical
conduct is not the abstract formal contradictory of logical conduct any
more than present satiety or foolishness is the contradictory of later
hunger or wisdom, or than anger at one person contradicts cordiality to
another, or to the same person, later. The old bogie of the logical
irrelevance of origin was due to the inability to conceive continuity
except in the form of identity in which there was no place for the
notion of _growth_.

The conditions under which non-logical conduct _becomes_ logical are
familiar to those who have followed the doctrines of experimental logic
as expounded in the discussions of the past few years. The
transformation begins at the point where non-logical processes instead
of operating as direct unambiguous stimuli and response become ambiguous
with consequent inhibition of conduct. But again this does not mean that
at this juncture the non-logical processes quit the field and give place
to a totally new faculty and process called reason. They stay on the
job. But there is a change in the job, which now is to get rid of this
ambiguity. This modification of the task requires, of course,
corresponding modification and adaptation of these operations. They take
on the form of sensations and universals, terms and relations, data and
hypotheses. This modification of function and form constitutes "reason"
or, better, reasoning.

Here some one will ask, "Whence comes this ambiguity? How can a mere
perception or memory as such be ambiguous? Must it not be ambiguous to,
or for, something, or some one?" The point is well taken. But it should
not be taken to imply that the ambiguity is for a merely onlooking,
beholding psychical mind--especially when the perception is itself
regarded as an act of beholding. Nor are we any better off i