place in analytic logic for hypotheses are equally anxious to preserve
their connections with science. Hence they boldly challenge the
"superstition" that science has anything to do with hypotheses. Newton's
"_Hypotheses non fingo_" should be the motto of every conscientious
scientist who dares "trust his own perceptions and disregard the ukase
of idealism." "The theory of mental construction is the child of
idealism, now put out to service for the support of its parents."
"Theory is no longer regarded in science as an hypothesis added to the
observed facts," but a law which is "found in the facts."[27] The
identity of this with Mill's doctrine of hypotheses as "found in things"
is obvious.

As against the conception of hypotheses as "free," "winged,"
constructions of a psychical, beholding, gossiping mind we may well take
our stand with those who would exclude such hypotheses from science. And
this doubtless was the sort of mind and sort of hypotheses Newton meant
when he said "_Hypotheses non fingo_."[28] But had Newton's mind really
been of the character which he, as a physicist, had learned from
philosophers to suppose it to be, and had he really waited to find his
hypotheses ready-made in the facts, there never would have been any
dispute about who discovered the calculus, and we should never have been
interested in what Newton said about hypotheses or anything else. What
Newton did is a much better source of information on the part hypotheses
play in scientific method than what he said about them. The former
speaks for itself; the latter is the pious repetition of a metaphysical
creed made necessary by the very separation of mind from things
expressed in the statement quoted.

Logically there is little to choose between hypotheses found ready-made
in the facts and those which are the "winged" constructions of a purely
psychical mind. Both are equally useless in logic and in science. One
makes logic and science "trifling," the other makes them "miraculous."
But if hypotheses be conceived not as the output of a cloistered
psychical entity but as the joint product of all the beings and
operations involved in the specific situation in which logical inquiry
originates, and more particularly in all those involved in the
operations of the inquiry itself (including all the experimental
material and apparatus which the inquiry may require), we shall have
sufficient continuity between hypotheses and things to do away wit