dapted for dealing with certain experience adjustments, and the
differences in the development of the different sciences merely express
different degrees of success with which such languages have been
formulated with respect to making it possible to predict concerning not
yet realized situations. Some sciences are still seeking their terms and
fundamental concepts, others are formulating their first "grammar," and
mathematics, still inadequate, yearly gains both in vocabulary and
flexibility.
But if we are to conceive mathematical entities as mere terminal points
in a relational system, it is necessary that we should become clear as
to just what is meant by relation, and what is the connection between
relations and quantities. Modern thought has shown a strong tendency to
insist, somewhat arbitrarily, on the "internal" or "external" character
of relations. The former emphasis has been primarily associated with
idealistic ontology, and has often brought with it complex dialectic
questions as to the identity of an individual thing in passing from one
relational situation to another. The latter insistence has meant
primarily that things do not change with changing relations to other
things. It has, however, often implied the independent existence, in
some curiously metaphysical state, of relations that are not relating
anything, and is hardly less paradoxical than the older view. In the
field of physical phenomena, it seems to triumph, while the facts of
social life, on the other hand, lend some countenance to the view of the
"internalists." Like many such discussions, the best way around them is
to forget their arguments, and turn to a fresh and independent
investigation of the facts in question.
IV
THINGS, RELATIONS, AND QUANTITIES
As I write, the way is paved for me by Professor Cohen (_Journ. of
Phil., Psy., and Sci. Meth._, Vol. XI, No. 23, Nov. 5, 1914, pp.
623-24), who outlines a theory of relations closely allied to that which
I have in mind. Professor Cohen writes: "Like the distinction between
primary and secondary qualities, the distinction between qualities and
relations seems to me a shifting one because the 'nature' of a thing
changes as the thing shifts from one context to another.... To
Professors Montague and Lovejoy the 'thing' is like an old-fashioned
landowner and the qualities are its immemorial private possessions. A
thing may enter into commercial relations with others, but these
relations
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