tive Evolution the operations of
intelligence are neither creative nor evolutional. They not only have no
constructive part but are positively destructive and devolutional.

Since, moreover, these logical operations, like those of the objective
universal, and like Mill's association of particulars, can only
reproduce in fragmentary form what has already been done, it is
difficult to see how they can meet the demands of action. For here no
more than in Mill, or in the logic of idealism, is there any place for
constructive hypotheses or any technique by which they can become
effective. Whatever "Creative Evolution" may be, there is no place in
its logic for "Creative Intelligence."

IV

The prominence in current discussion of the logical reforms proposed by
the "analytic logic" of the neo-realistic movement and the enthusiastic
optimism of its representatives over the prospective results of these
reforms for logic, science, and practical life are the warrant for
devoting a special section to their discussion.

There are indeed some marked differences of opinion among the
expounders of the "new logic" concerning the results which it is
expected to achieve. Some find that it clears away incredible
accumulations of metaphysical lumber; others rejoice that it is to
restore metaphysics, "once the queen of the sciences, to her ancient
throne."

But whatever the difference among the representatives of analytical
logic all seem agreed at the outset on two fundamental reforms which the
"new logic" makes. These are: first, that analytic logic gets rid
entirely of the _act_ of knowing, the retention of which has been the
bane of all other logics; second, in its discovery of "terms and
relations," "sense-data and universals" as the simple elements not only
of logic but of the world, it furnishes science at last with the simple
neutral elements at large which it is supposed science so long has
sought, and "mourned because it found them not."

Taking these in order, we are told that "realism frees logic as a study
of objective fact from all accounts of the states and operations of
mind." ... "Logic and mathematics are sciences which can be pursued
quite independently of the study of knowing."[20] "The new logic
believes that it deals with no such entities as thoughts, ideas, or
minds, but with entities that merely are."[20]

The motive for the banishment of the act of knowing from logic is that
as an _act_ knowing is "mental