it is worth while to note the
character of the entities that "merely are" with which analytic logic
proposes exclusively to deal. In their general form they are "terms" and
"propositions," "sense-data" and universals. We are struck at once by
the fact that these entities bear the names of logical operations. They
are, to be sure, disguised as entities and have been baptised in a
highly dilute solution of objectivity called "subsistence." But this
does not conceal their origin, nor does it obscure the fact that if it
is possible for any entities that "merely are" to have logical character
those made from hypostatized processes of logical operations should be
the most promising. They might be expected to retain some vestiges of
logical character even after they have been torn from the process of
inquiry and converted into "entities that merely are." Also it is not
surprising that having stripped the act of knowing of its constituent
operations analytic logic should feel that it can well dispense with the
empty shell called "mind" and, as Professor Dewey says, "wish it on
psychology." But if the analytic logician be also a philosopher and
perchance a lover of his fellow-man, it is hard to see how he can have a
good conscience over this disposition of the case.

Turning now to the character of inference and of truth and falsity which
are possible in a logic which excludes the operation of knowing and
deals only with "entities that are," all the expounders seem to agree
that in such a logic inference must be purely deductive. All alleged
induction is either disguised deduction or a lucky guess. This raises
apprehension at the start concerning the value of analytic logic for
other sciences. But let us observe what deduction in analytic logic is.

We begin at once with a distinction which involves the whole issue.[23]
We are asked to carefully distinguish "logical" deduction from
"psychological" deduction. The latter is the vulgar meaning of the term,
and is "the thinker's name for his own act of conforming his thought" to
the objective and independent processes that constitute the real logical
process. This act of conforming the mind is a purely "psychological"
affair. It has no logical function whatever. In what the "conforming"
consists is not clear. It seems to be merely the act of turning the
"psychological" eye on the objective logical process. "One beholds it
(the logical process) as one beholds a star, a river, a char