avoid the old predicament of knowledge
that is trifling or miraculous, tautologous or false, if it is to have
no fear of the challenge of other sciences or of practical life, it must
be content to take for its subject-matter the operations of intelligence
conceived as real acts on the same metaphysical plane and in strictest
continuity with other acts. Such a logic will not fear the challenge of
science, for it is precisely this continuity that makes possible
experimentation, which is the fundamental characteristic of scientific
procedure. Science without experiment is indeed a strange apparition. It
is a [Greek: logos] with no [Greek: legein], a science with no _scire_;
and this spells dogmatism. How necessary such continuity is to
experimentation is apparent when we recall that there is no limit to the
range of operations of every sort which scientific experiment calls into
play; and that unless there be thoroughgoing continuity between the
logical demand of the experiment and all the materials and devices
employed in the process of the experiment, the operations of the latter
in the experiment will be either miraculous or ruinous.

Finally, if this continuity of the operations of intelligence with
other operations be essential to science, its relation to "practical"
life is _ipso facto_ established. For science is "practical" life
aware of its problems and aware of the part that experimental--i.e.,
creative--intelligence plays in the solution of those problems.

INTELLIGENCE AND MATHEMATICS

HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN

Herbart is said to have given the deathblow to faculty psychology. Man
no longer appears endowed with volition, passion, desire, and reason;
and logic, deprived of its hereditary right to elucidate the operations
of inherent intelligence, has the new problem of investigating forms of
intelligence in the making. This is no inconsequential task. "If man
originally possesses only capacities which after a given amount of
education will produce ideas and judgments" (Thorndike, _Educational
Psychology_, Vol. I, p. 198), and if these ideas and judgments are to be
substituted for a mythical intelligence it follows that tracing their
development and observing their functioning renders clearer our
conception of their nature and value and brings us nearer that exact
knowledge of what we are talking about in which the philosopher at least
aspires to equal the scientist, however much he may fall below his
ide