the Prime Minister. "As regards
Salonica it is very difficult to get in a word; they were both full of
the necessity of pushing in troops, and would not think of coming out.
They simply sweep all military difficulties and dangers aside, and go
on political lines--such as saving a remnant of Serbs, bringing Greece
in, and inducing Rumania to join." [2]
Other conferences followed, at all of which the French spoke so loudly
that the noble British nation could not possibly help hearing--_la
noble nation britannique n'est pas restee sourde_. The truth is,
France was set on what {77} M. Delcasse now called the _mirage
balkanique_, partly from considerations of a domestic nature, chiefly
for reasons connected with the future balance of power in the Near
East--and England could not leave her there alone. So the "_nous
resterons_" policy prevailed; and the continued presence of
Franco-British forces on Greek soil led, as it was bound to do, to
abnormal relations with the Greek Government.
The wish of the Allies was to obtain from Greece full licence for the
safe accommodation and the operations of their troops; while it was the
earnest endeavour of Greece not to let her complaisance towards one
group of belligerents compromise her in the eyes of the other. The
little kingdom found itself between two clashing forces: the one
triumphant on land, the other dominating the sea. But of the two the
German peril was the more imminent. The Kaiser's legions were at
Monastir--any act that might be construed as a breach of neutrality
would bring them in a month to Athens.
M. Skouloudis--a stately octogenarian who, after refusing three times
the Premiership, had assumed power in this crisis at the King's
insistent desire because, as he said, he considered it his duty so to
do--took up the only attitude that could have been expected in the
circumstances: the attitude that was dictated by the instinct of
self-preservation.
Unlike M. Venizelos, whose mind revolved constantly about war at all
hazards: unlike other statesmen who regarded war as an eventuality to
be accepted or declined according as conditions might be favourable or
unfavourable, M. Skouloudis seemed resolutely to eliminate war from his
thoughts.
On taking office he gave the Entente Powers "most categorical
assurances of a steady determination to carry on the policy of
neutrality in the form of most sincere benevolence towards them. The
new Ministry," he added,
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