ncludes not only the military strength afloat, that rules the sea or
any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and
shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully
springs, and on which it securely rests.

The principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations may be
enumerated as follows: I. Geographical Position. II. Physical
Conformation, including, as connected therewith, natural productions
and climate. III. Extent of Territory. IV. Number of Population. V.
Character of the People. VI. Character of the Government, including
therein the national institutions.

I. _Geographical Position._--It may be pointed out, in the first
place, that if a nation be so situated that it is neither forced to
defend itself by land nor induced to seek extension of its territory
by way of the land, it has, by the very unity of its aim directed upon
the sea, an advantage as compared with a people one of whose
boundaries is continental. This has been a great advantage to England
over both France and Holland as a sea power. The strength of the
latter was early exhausted by the necessity of keeping up a large army
and carrying on expensive wars to preserve her independence; while the
policy of France was constantly diverted, sometimes wisely and
sometimes most foolishly, from the sea to projects of continental
extension. These military efforts expended wealth; whereas a wiser and
consistent use of her geographical position would have added to it.

The geographical position may be such as of itself to promote a
concentration, or to necessitate a dispersion, of the naval forces.
Here again the British Islands have an advantage over France. The
position of the latter, touching the Mediterranean as well as the
ocean, while it has its advantages, is on the whole a source of
military weakness at sea. The eastern and western French fleets have
only been able to unite after passing through the Straits of
Gibraltar, in attempting which they have often risked and sometimes
suffered loss. The position of the United States upon the two oceans
would be either a source of great weakness or a cause of enormous
expense, had it a large sea commerce on both coasts.

England, by her immense colonial empire, has sacrificed much of this
advantage of concentration of force around her own shores; but the
sacrifice was wisely made, for the gain was greater than the loss, as
the event proved. With the growth of h