ustria, and Jena to
Prussia; an empire would have been laid prostrate by the destruction
or disorganization of its military forces, which, it is said, were the
favorite objective of Napoleon.

But does the consideration of such exceptional disasters in the past
justify the putting a low value upon that reserve strength, based upon
the number of inhabitants fitted for a certain kind of military life,
which is here being considered? The blows just mentioned were dealt by
men of exceptional genius, at the head of armed bodies of exceptional
training, _esprit-de-corps_, and prestige, and were, besides,
inflicted upon opponents more or less demoralized by conscious
inferiority and previous defeat. Austerlitz had been closely preceded
by Ulm, where thirty thousand Austrians laid down their arms without a
battle; and the history of the previous years had been one long record
of Austrian reverse and French success. Trafalgar followed closely
upon a cruise, justly called a campaign, of almost constant failure;
and farther back, but still recent, were the memories of St. Vincent
for the Spaniards, and of the Nile for the French, in the allied
fleet. Except the case of Jena, these crushing overthrows were not
single disasters, but final blows; and in the Jena campaign there was
a disparity in numbers, equipment, and general preparation for war,
which makes it less applicable in considering what may result from a
single victory.

England is at the present time the greatest maritime nation in the
world; in steam and iron she has kept the superiority she had in the
days of sail and wood. France and England are the two powers that have
the largest military navies; and it is so far an open question which
of the two is the more powerful, that they may be regarded as
practically of equal strength in material for a sea war. In the case
of a collision can there be assumed such a difference of _personnel_,
or of preparation, as to make it probable that a decisive inequality
will result from one battle or one campaign? If not, the reserve
strength will begin to tell; organized reserve first, then reserve of
seafaring population, reserve of mechanical skill, reserve of wealth.
It seems to have been somewhat forgotten that England's leadership in
mechanical arts gives her a reserve of mechanics, who can easily
familiarize themselves with the appliances of modern iron-clads; and
as her commerce and industries feel the burden of the war, the s