for the loss of Gibraltar, the position of Spain would have been
closely analogous to that of England. Looking at once upon the
Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with Cadiz on the one side and
Cartagena on the other, the trade to the Levant must have passed under
her hands, and that round the Cape of Good Hope not far from her
doors. But Gibraltar not only deprived her of the control of the
Straits, it also imposed an obstacle to the easy junction of the two
divisions of her fleet.

At the present day, looking only at the geographical position of
Italy, and not at the other conditions affecting her sea power, it
would seem that with her extensive sea-coast and good ports she is
very well placed for exerting a decisive influence on the trade route
to the Levant and by the Isthmus of Suez. This is true in a degree,
and would be much more so did Italy now hold all the islands naturally
Italian; but with Malta in the hands of England, and Corsica in those
of France, the advantages of her geographical position are largely
neutralized. From race affinities and situation those two islands are
as legitimately objects of desire to Italy as Gibraltar is to Spain.
If the Adriatic were a great highway of commerce, Italy's position
would be still more influential. These defects in her geographical
completeness, combined with other causes injurious to a full and
secure development of sea power, make it more than doubtful whether
Italy can for some time be in the front rank among the sea nations.

As the aim here is not an exhaustive discussion, but merely an
attempt to show, by illustration, how vitally the situation of a
country may affect its career upon the sea, this division of the
subject may be dismissed for the present; the more so as instances
which will further bring out its importance will continually recur in
the historical treatment. Two remarks, however, are here appropriate.

Circumstances have caused the Mediterranean Sea to play a greater part
in the history of the world, both in a commercial and a military point
of view, than any other sheet of water of the same size. Nation after
nation has striven to control it, and the strife still goes on.
Therefore a study of the conditions upon which preponderance in its
waters has rested, and now rests, and of the relative military values
of different points upon its coasts, will be more instructive than the
same amount of effort expended in another field. Furthermore, it has