was consistently
followed. The war of the American Revolution was, it is true, a great
mistake, looked at from the point of view of sea power; but the
government was led into it insensibly by a series of natural blunders.
Putting aside political and constitutional considerations, and looking
at the question as purely military or naval, the case was this: The
American colonies were large and growing communities at a great
distance from England. So long as they remained attached to the
mother-country, as they then were enthusiastically, they formed a
solid base for her sea power in that part of the world; but their
extent and population were too great, when coupled with the distance
from England, to afford any hope of holding them by force, _if_ any
powerful nations were willing to help them. This "if," however,
involved a notorious probability; the humiliation of France and Spain
was so bitter and so recent that they were sure to seek revenge, and
it was well known that France in particular had been carefully and
rapidly building up her navy. Had the colonies been thirteen islands,
the sea power of England would quickly have settled the question; but
instead of such a physical barrier they were separated only by local
jealousies which a common danger sufficiently overcame. To enter
deliberately on such a contest, to try to hold by force so extensive a
territory, with a large hostile population, so far from home, was to
renew the Seven Years' War with France and Spain, and with the
Americans, against, instead of for, England. The Seven Years' War had
been so heavy a burden that a wise government would have known that
the added weight could not be borne, and have seen it was necessary to
conciliate the colonists. The government of the day was not wise, and
a large element of England's sea power was sacrificed; but by mistake,
not wilfully; through arrogance, not through weakness.
This steady keeping to a general line of policy was doubtless made
specially easy for successive English governments by the clear
indications of the country's conditions. Singleness of purpose was to
some extent imposed. The firm maintenance of her sea power, the
haughty determination to make it felt, the wise state of preparation
in which its military element was kept, were yet more due to that
feature of her political institutions which practically gave the
government, during the period in question, into the hands of a
class,--a landed aristoc
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