few
points specially weak from their saliency, and all important parts of
the frontiers can be readily attained,--cheaply by water, rapidly by
rail. The weakest frontier, the Pacific, is far removed from the most
dangerous of possible enemies. The internal resources are boundless as
compared with present needs; we can live off ourselves indefinitely in
"our little corner," to use the expression of a French officer to the
author. Yet should that little corner be invaded by a new commercial
route through the Isthmus, the United States in her turn may have the
rude awakening of those who have abandoned their share in the common
birthright of all people, the sea.

III. _Extent of Territory._--The last of the conditions affecting the
development of a nation as a sea power, and touching the country
itself as distinguished from the people who dwell there, is Extent of
Territory. This may be dismissed with comparatively few words.

As regards the development of sea power, it is not the total number of
square miles which a country contains, but the length of its
coast-line and the character of its harbors that are to be considered.
As to these it is to be said that, the geographical and physical
conditions being the same, extent of sea-coast is a source of strength
or weakness according as the population is large or small. A country
is in this like a fortress; the garrison must be proportioned to the
_enceinte_. A recent familiar instance is found in the American War of
Secession. Had the South had a people as numerous as it was warlike,
and a navy commensurate to its other resources as a sea power, the
great extent of its sea-coast and its numerous inlets would have been
elements of great strength. The people of the United States and the
Government of that day justly prided themselves on the effectiveness
of the blockade of the whole Southern coast. It was a great feat, a
very great feat; but it would have been an impossible feat had the
Southerners been more numerous, and a nation of seamen. What was there
shown was not, as has been said, how such a blockade can be
maintained, but that such a blockade is possible in the face of a
population not only unused to the sea, but also scanty in numbers.
Those who recall how the blockade was maintained, and the class of
ships that blockaded during great part of the war, know that the plan,
correct under the circumstances, could not have been carried out in
the face of a real navy.