red and three
ships-of-the-line and fifty-five frigates.
To turn now from the particular lessons drawn from the history of the
past to the general question of the influence of government upon the
sea career of its people, it is seen that that influence can work in
two distinct but closely related ways.
First, in peace: The government by its policy can favor the natural
growth of a people's industries and its tendencies to seek adventure
and gain by way of the sea; or it can try to develop such industries
and such sea-going bent, when they do not naturally exist; or, on the
other hand, the government may by mistaken action check and fetter the
progress which the people left to themselves would make. In any one of
these ways the influence of the government will be felt, making or
marring the sea power of the country in the matter of peaceful
commerce; upon which alone, it cannot be too often insisted, a
thoroughly strong navy can be based.
Secondly, for war: The influence of the government will be felt in its
most legitimate manner in maintaining an armed navy, of a size
commensurate with the growth of its shipping and the importance of the
interests connected with it. More important even than the size of the
navy is the question of its institutions, favoring a healthful spirit
and activity, and providing for rapid development in time of war by an
adequate reserve of men and of ships and by measures for drawing out
that general reserve power which has before been pointed to, when
considering the character and pursuits of the people. Undoubtedly
under this second head of warlike preparation must come the
maintenance of suitable naval stations, in those distant parts of the
world to which the armed shipping must follow the peaceful vessels of
commerce. The protection of such stations must depend either upon
direct military force, as do Gibraltar and Malta, or upon a
surrounding friendly population, such as the American colonists once
were to England, and, it may be presumed, the Australian colonists now
are. Such friendly surroundings and backing, joined to a reasonable
military provision, are the best of defences, and when combined with
decided preponderance at sea, make a scattered and extensive empire,
like that of England, secure; for while it is true that an unexpected
attack may cause disaster in some one quarter, the actual superiority
of naval power prevents such disaster from being general or
irremediable. H
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