and army
as well as of a fleet. The more important part may, in our case,
be that of the latter; but the services of the former cannot be
dispensed with. The best method of utilising those services calls
for much thought. In 1798, when the 'First Army of England' menaced
us from the southern coast of the Channel, it was reported to our
Government that an examination of the plans formerly adopted for
frustrating intended invasions showed the advantage of troubling
the enemy in his own home and not waiting till he had come to
injure us in ours.

VII

OVER-SEA RAIDS AND RAIDS ON LAND[64]

[Footnote 64: Written in 1906. (_The_Morning_Post_.)]

It has been contended that raids by 'armaments with 1000, 20,000,
and 50,000 men on board respectively' have succeeded in evading
'our watching and chasing fleets,' and that consequently invasion
of the British Isles on a great scale is not only possible but
fairly practicable, British naval predominance notwithstanding.
I dispute the accuracy of the history involved in the allusions
to the above-stated figures. The number of men comprised in a
raiding or invading expedition is the number that is or can be
put on shore. The crews of the transports are not included in
it. In the cases alluded to, Humbert's expedition was to have
numbered 82 officers and 1017 other ranks, and 984 were put on
shore in Killala Bay. Though the round number, 1000, represents
this figure fairly enough, there was a 10 per cent. shrinkage
from the original embarkation strength. In Hoche's expedition
the total number of troops embarked was under 14,000, of whom
633 were lost before the expedition had got clear of its port of
starting, and of the remainder only a portion reached Ireland.
General Bonaparte landed in Egypt not 50,000 men, but about 36,000.
In the expeditions of Hoche and Humbert it was not expected that
the force to be landed would suffice of itself, the belief being
that it would be joined in each case by a large body of adherents
in the raided country. Outside the ranks of the 'extremists of the
dinghy school'--whose number is unknown and is almost certainly
quite insignificant--no one asserts or ever has asserted that raids
in moderate strength are not possible even in the face of a strong
defending navy. It is a fact that the whole of our defence policy
for many generations has been based upon an admission of their
possibility. Captain Mahan's statement of the case has never been