the 'long-shore traffic' and defy
the efforts of a localised force to prevent him. The history of the
Great War at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning
of the nineteenth teems with instances of interruption by our
navy of the enemy's coast-wise trade when his ocean trade had
been destroyed. The history of the American War of 1812 supplies
other instances.

The localised defence could not attempt to drive off hostile
cruisers remaining far from the shore and meaning to infest the
great lines of maritime communication running towards it. If
those cruisers are to be driven off at all it can be done only
by cruising ships. Unless, therefore, we are to be content to
leave our ocean routes, where most crowded and therefore most
vulnerable, to the mercy of an enemy, we must have cruisers to
meet the hostile cruisers. If we still adhere to our localised
defence, we shall have two distinct kinds of force---one provided
merely for local, and consequently restricted, action; the other
able to act near the shore or far out at sea as circumstances
may demand. If we go to the expense of providing both kinds, we
shall have followed the example of the sage who cut a large hole
in his study door for the cat and a small one for the kitten.

Is local naval defence, then, of any use? Well, to tell the truth,
not much; and only in rare and exceptional circumstances. Even in
the case of the smaller maritime countries, to which reference
has been made above, defence of the character in question would
avail little if a powerful assailant were resolved to press home his
attack. That is to say, if only absolute belligerent considerations
were regarded. In war, however, qualifying considerations can
never be left out of sight. As the great Napoleon observed, you
can no more make war without incurring losses than you can make
omelettes without breaking eggs. The strategist--and the tactician
also, within his province--will always count the cost of a proposed
operation, even where they are nearly certain of success. The
occupation of a country, which would be of no great practical
value to you when you got it, would be a poor return for the
loss to which you would have been put in the process. That loss
might, and probably would, leave you at a great disadvantage
as regards enemies more nearly on an equality with yourself. It
would, therefore, not be the improbability of breaking down the
local naval defence of a minor maritime