nception his
biographers, one after another, have protested in vain.

At the outset of this investigation it will be well to call to
mind two or three things, simple enough, but not always remembered.
One of these is that advancing to the attack and the attack itself
are not the same operations. Another is, that, in the order of
sailing in two or more columns, if the ships were 'by the wind'
or close-hauled--the column-leaders were not abeam of each other,
but bore from one another in the direction of the wind. Also, it
may be mentioned that by simple alterations of course a line-abreast
may be converted into a line-of-bearing and a line-of-bearing
into a line-ahead, and that the reverse can be effected by the
same operation. Again, adherence to a plan which presupposes
the enemy's fleet to be in a particular formation after he is
found to be in another is not to be expected of a consummate
tactician. This remark is introduced here with full knowledge
of the probability that it will be quoted as an admission that
Nelson did change his plan without warning. No admission of the
kind is intended. 'In all cases of anticipated battle,' says Mahan,
'Nelson was careful to put his subordinates in possession both of
his general plans and, as far as possible, of the underlying ideas.'
The same biographer tells us, what is well worth remembering, that
'No man was ever better served than Nelson by the inspiration
of the moment; no man ever counted on it less.'

The plan announced in the celebrated memorandum of 9th October
1805 indicated, for the attack from to windward, that the British
fleet, in what would be called on shore an echelon of two main
divisions and an 'advance squadron,' would move against an enemy
assumed to be in single line-ahead. The 'advance squadron,' it
should be noted, was not to be ahead of the two main divisions,
but in such a position that it could be moved to strengthen either.
The name seems to have been due to the mode in which the ships
composing the squadron were employed in, so to speak, 'feeling
for' the enemy. On 19th October six ships were ordered 'to go
ahead during the night'; and, besides the frigates, two more
ships were so stationed as to keep up the communication between
the six and the commander-in-chief's flag-ship. Thus eight ships
in effect composed an 'advance squadron,' and did not join either
of the main divisions at first.

When it was expected that the British fleet would compr