ts base--that he would not have
staked his reputation on the fate of a body so conditioned, if
he had been permitted by the naval conditions of the case to lead
a larger, more effectually organised, and better supplied army.
The commentary supplied by Captain Desbriere to the volume under
notice discloses his opinion that the failure of the expedition
to Ireland was due to the inefficiency of the French Navy. He
endeavours to be scrupulously fair to his naval fellow-countrymen;
but his conviction is apparent. It hardly admits of doubt that this
view has generally been, and still is, prevalent in the French
Army. Foreign soldiers of talent and experience generalise from
this as follows: Let them but have the direction of the naval
as well as of the military part of an expedition, and the invasion
of England must be successful. The complete direction which they
would like is exactly what Hoche did have. He chose the commander
of the fleet, and also chose or regulated the choice of the junior
flag officers and several of the captains. Admiral Morard de
Galles was not, and did not consider himself, equal to the task
for which Hoche's favour had selected him. His letter pointing
out his own disqualifications has a striking resemblance to the
one written by Medina Sidonia in deprecation of his appointment
in place of Santa Cruz. Nevertheless, the French naval officers
did succeed in conveying the greater part of the expeditionary
army to a point at which disembarkation was practicable.

Now we have some lessons to learn from this. The advantages conferred
by command of the sea must be utilised intelligently; and it
was bad management which permitted an important anchorage to
remain for more than a fortnight in the hands of an invading
force. We need not impute to our neighbours a burning desire to
invade us; but it is a becoming exercise of ordinary strategic
precaution to contemplate preparations for repelling what, as a
mere military problem, they consider still feasible. No amount
of naval superiority will ever ensure every part of our coast
against incursions like that of Tate and his gaol-birds. Naval
superiority, however, will put in our hands the power of preventing
the arrival of an army strong enough to carry out a real invasion.
The strength of such an army will largely depend upon the amount of
mobile land force of which we can dispose. Consequently, defence
against invasion, even of an island, is the duty of a l