brunt of the action would have been more
equally felt' had a different mode of advance from that actually
chosen been adopted. Now, Trafalgar was a battle in which an
inferior fleet of twenty-six ships gained a victory over a superior
fleet of thirty-three. The victory was so decisive that more than
half of the enemy's capital ships were captured or destroyed
on the spot, and the remainder were so battered that some fell
an easy prey to the victor's side soon after the battle, the
rest having limped painfully to the shelter of a fortified port
near at hand. To gain such a victory over a superior force of
seamen justly celebrated for their spirit and gallantry, very
hard fighting was necessary. The only actions of the Napoleonic
period that can be compared with it are those of Camperdown, the
Nile, and Copenhagen. The proportionate loss at Trafalgar was the
least in all the four battles.[84] The allegation that, had Nelson
followed a different method at Trafalgar, the 'brunt of the action
would have been more equally felt' can be disposed of easily. In
nearly all sea-fights, whether Nelsonic in character or not,
half of the loss of the victors has fallen on considerably less
than half the fleet. That this has been the rule, whatever tactical
method may have been adopted, will appear from the following
statement. In Rodney's victory (12th April 1782) half the loss
fell upon nine ships out of thirty-six, or one-fourth; at 'The
First of June' it fell upon five ships out of twenty-five, or
one-fifth; at St. Vincent it fell upon three ships out of fifteen,
also one-fifth; at Trafalgar half the loss fell on five ships
out of twenty-seven, or very little less than an exact fifth.
It has, therefore, been conclusively shown that, faulty or not
faulty, long-announced or hastily adopted, the plan on which
the battle of Trafalgar was fought did not occasion excessive
loss to the victors or confine the loss, such as it was, to an
unduly small portion of their fleet. As bearing on this question
of the relative severity of the British loss at Trafalgar, it
may be remarked that in that battle there were several British
ships which had been in other great sea-fights. Their losses
in these latter were in nearly every case heavier than their
Trafalgar losses.[85] Authoritative and undisputed figures show
how baseless are the suggestions that Nelson's tactical procedure
at Trafalgar caused his fleet to suffer needlessly heavy loss.

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