the distance at which they had been employed from the rest of
the fleet and the feebleness of the breeze--not till several
hours after the combined fleet had been sighted.

Collingwood preserved in his division a line-of-bearing apparently
until the very moment when the individual ships pushed on to make
the actual attack. The enemy's fleet is usually represented as
forming a curve. It would probably be more correct to call it a
very obtuse re-entering angle. This must have been largely due to
Gravina's 'squadron of observation' keeping away in succession,
to get into the wake of the rest of the line, which was forming
towards the north. About the centre of the combined fleet there
was a gap of a mile. Ahead and astern of this the ships were not
all in each other's wake. Many were to leeward of their stations,
thus giving the enemy's formation the appearance of a double line,
or rather of a string of groups of ships. It is important to
remember this, because no possible mode of attack--the enemy's
fleet being formed as it was--could have prevented some British
ships from being 'doubled on' when they cut into the enemy's
force. On 'The First of June,' notwithstanding that the advance
to the attack was intended to be in line-abreast, several British
ships were 'doubled on,' and even 'trebled on,' as will be seen
in the experiences on that day of the _Brunswick_, _Marlborough_,
_Royal_Sovereign_, and _Queen_Charlotte_ herself.

Owing to the shape of the hostile 'line' at Trafalgar and the
formation in which he kept his division, Collingwood brought his
ships, up till the very moment when each proceeded to deliver her
attack, in the formation laid down in the oft-quoted memorandum. By
the terms of that document Nelson had specifically assigned to his
own division the work of seeing that the movements of Collingwood's
division should be interrupted as little as possible. It would,
of course, have been beyond his power to do this if the position
of his own division in the echelon formation prescribed in the
memorandum had been rigorously adhered to after Collingwood was
getting near his objective point. In execution, therefore, of
the service allotted to his division, Nelson made a feint at
the enemy's van. This necessitated an alteration of course to
port, so that his ships came into a 'line-of-bearing' so very
oblique that it may well have been loosely called a 'line-ahead.'
Sir Charles Ekins says that the two British