in all this is the complete
omission to take note of the conditions involved in the command
of the sea.

Evidently it had not been understood that it was that very command
which alone had enabled the armies of western Europe to proceed,
not only without serious interruption, but also without encountering
an attempt at obstruction, to the field in the Crimea on which
their victories had been won, and that the same command would be
necessary before any hostile expedition, large enough to justify
the construction of the fortifications specially intended to
repel it, could cross the sea and get within striking distance
of our shores. It should be deeply interesting to the people
of those parts of the British Empire which lie beyond sea to
note that the defensive system comprised in the fortification
of the coast of the United Kingdom promised no security to them
in the event of war. Making all proper allowance for the superior
urgency of defending the heart of the empire, we must still admit
that no system of defence is adequate which does not provide for
the defence of other valuable parts of the great body politic
as well.

Again, the system of defence proved to be imperfect. Every part
of the empire depended for prosperity--some parts depended for
existence--on practically unrestricted traffic on the ocean.
This, which might be assailed at many points and on lines often
thousands of miles in length, could find little or no defence in
immovable fortifications. It could not be held that the existence
of these released the fleet from all duty but that of protecting
our ocean commerce, because, if any enemy's navy was able to
carry out an operation of such magnitude and difficulty as a
serious attack on our home territory, it would assuredly be able
to carry out the work of damaging our maritime trade. Power to
do the latter has always belonged to the navy which was in a
position to extend its activity persistently to the immediate
neighbourhood of its opponent's coast-line.

It is not to be supposed that there was no one to point this
out. Several persons did so, but being mostly sailors they were
not listened to. In actual practice the whole domain of imperial
strategy was withdrawn from the intervention of the naval officer,
as though it were something with which he could not have anything
to do. Several great wars had been waged in Europe in the meantime,
and all of them were land wars. Naval forces, if employed a