dships that the judgment of the court below in this
case be _affirmed_." He proceeded to compliment the judges on the
patient and laborious attention and research which they had bestowed
upon the case. "My lords," said he, "with respect to all the points
submitted to their consideration, with the exception of one
question--for in substance it _was_ one question--their opinion and
judgment have been unanimous. With reference to that one question, seven
of the learned judges, with the Chief-Justice of the Common Pleas at
their head, have expressed a distinct, a clear, and decided opinion
against the objections which were urged. Two other learned judges have
expressed an adverse opinion. I may be permitted to say--and all who
were present to hear them must agree with me--that it was an opinion
accompanied with much doubt and much hesitation. I think, under these
circumstances, that _unless your lordships are thoroughly and entirely
satisfied that the opinion of the great majority of the judges was
founded in palpable error_, your lordships will feel yourselves, in a
case of this kind, bound by their decision to adhere to and support
their judgment, and act in conformity with it." After briefly stating
the only question before them--viz. "whether, there being defective
counts in the indictment, and other counts with defective findings on
them, a general judgment can be sustained?"--he proceeded, "Your
lordships will observe that this is a mere technical question, though, I
admit, of great importance--never presented to the judges of the court
below, not calling in question their judgment in substance--but arising
entirely out of the manner in which that judgment has been entered up,
by those whose province it was to discharge that particular duty." He
then made the following decisive and authoritative declaration, which
all who know the accurate and profound learning and the vast judicial
experience of the Chancellor will know how to value. "Allow me, my
lords, to say, that _it has always been considered as a clear, distinct,
and undoubted principle of the criminal law of England, that in a case
of this nature a general judgment is sufficient_; and from the first
moment when I entered the profession, down to the time when I heard the
question agitated at your lordships' bar, I never heard it called in
question. I have found it uniformly and constantly acted upon, without
doubt, without hesitation. I find it in all treatises,