efect in them is, generally speaking, irremediable and fatal,
and crime goes unpunished. If the new rule is to be really acted upon in
future, we must, in some way or other, alter the whole machinery of the
criminal law: but how to do so, without seriously interfering with the
liberty of the subject, we know not.

We affirm, therefore, that the old rule--viz. that one good count would
support a general verdict and judgment, though the indictment contained
bad ones also--was a beneficial rule, calculated to obviate _inevitable_
difficulties; and its policy was so transparent to all the great
intellects which have, both as judges or counsel, been for so long a
series of years concerned in criminal cases, that no one ever thought of
questioning it. The supposition of the three peers is one not very
flattering to the distinguished predecessors, with the great Lord
Mansfield at their head--all of whom it charges with gross negligence,
ignorance, and, in plain words, stupidity--in overlooking, from time to
time, a point so patent and glaring. The Lord Chancellor's answer to
their argument is triumphant; and we refer the reader to it.[24] We
respectfully and firmly enter our protest against Lord Denman's mode of
getting rid of the efficacy of a custom or practice which has been so
long observed by the profession; and regard it as one calculated to sap
the foundations of the common law of the land. An opinion, a practice
which has stood its ground for so long a series of years _unchallenged_,
amidst incessant provocation to challenge it--and that, too, in the case
of men of such vigilant astuteness, learning, and determination as have
long characterized the English Bench and Bar--rest upon as solid grounds
as are conceivable, and warrants it subversion only after profound
consideration, and _repeated evidence of its mischievous operation_. Was
any such evidence offered in the argument at the Bar of the House of
Lords, of persons who had suffered either a kind or a degree of
punishment not warranted by law? None: but several cases were put in
which--in spite of past experience to the contrary--inconvenience and
injustice _might possibly_ be conceived to occur hereafter!

What, then, led to this error--for error we must call it? Let us
candidly express our opinion that the three peers were fairly
"_overpowered_"--to adopt the frank acknowledgment of one of the most
distinguished among them--by the plausible fallacies urged upon t