_, I take to be one and the
same thing. For the authenticity of these maxims _rests entirely upon
reception and usage_; and the only method of proving that this or that
maxim is a rule of the common law, _is by showing that it hath been
always the custom to observe it_. But here a very natural and very
material question arises: how are these customs or maxims to be known;
and by whom is their validity to be determined? The answer is, by the
judges in the several courts of justice. They are the depositaries of
the laws--_the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt_,
and are bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the land."

These judges were appealed to by the House of Lords upon the present
occasion; and by an overwhelming majority "distinctly, clearly, and
decidedly" declared that the rule in question was a rule of the English
law. _They had heard all the arguments calling its existence in
question_ which Lord Denman, Lord Cottenham, and Lord Campbell had
heard; they were _in the daily and hourly administration of that branch
of the law with reference to which the question arose_; they took ample
time to consider the matter, and deliberately affirmed the existence of
the rule, and the valid grounds on which it rested. The highest legal
authority in the land, the Lord Chancellor, corroborated their decision,
declaring that it "has always been considered as a clear, distinct, and
undoubted principle of the criminal law, that one good count could
sustain a general judgment on a writ of error." Are Lord Lyndhurst and
Sir Nicholas Tindal, with eight of the judges, palpably and manifestly
wrong? It is certainly _possible_, though not, we presume, very
probable.

We fully recognise the _right_ of the judicial peers to examine the
validity of the reasons assigned by the judges, and to come to a
conclusion opposite to theirs. We apprehend that the long recognition,
alone, of the existence of a rule, does not prevent its being impeached
on sufficient reasons. Lord Tenterden, as cautious and accurate judge as
ever presided over a court of justice, thus expressed himself in
delivering the judgment of the court on a question of mercantile
law[16]--"It is of great importance, in almost every case, that a rule
once laid down, and firmly established, and continued to be acted upon
for many years, should not be changed, _unless it appears clearly to
have been founded on wrong principles_." Have, then, Lords D