terest and anxiety. If, in the deliberate
opinion of the country, the judgments of the High Court of Parliament
are habitually, though unconsciously, warped by party and political
feelings and prejudices; if, with such views and intentions, they have
strained and perverted the law of the land, wickedly sheltering
themselves under the unfortunate difference of opinion existing among
the judges, those who have been guilty of it will justly stand exposed
to universal execration. It is no light matter even to propose such a
possibility as that of profligacy or corruption in the administration of
justice; above all, in the highest tribunal in the land--the place of
last resort for the subject. It is always with pain and regret that we
hear, even in the height of political excitement and hostility, the
faintest imputation from any quarter on judicial integrity. We have
watched this case from first to last; and especially examined over and
over again, in a spirit of fearless freedom, the grounds assigned for
reversing the judgment, and the position and character of those by whose
_fiat_ that result was effected. We cannot bring ourselves to believe
any thing so dreadful as that three judicial noblemen have deliberately
violated their oaths, and perpetrated so enormous an offence as that of
knowingly deciding contrary to law. Those who publicly express that
opinion, incur a very grave responsibility. We are ourselves zealous,
but independent supporters of the present government; we applaud their
institution of these proceedings; no one can lament more bitterly than
we do, that O'Connell should, like many a criminal before him, have
escaped from justice through a flaw in the indictment; yet with all
this, we feel perfectly satisfied that the three peers who reversed the
judgment against him, believed that they were right in point of law.
When we find so high an authority as Mr Baron Parke--as far as politics
are concerned, a strong Conservative--declaring that he cannot possibly
bring himself to concur in opinion with his brethren; that another
judge--Mr Justice Coltman--after anxious deliberation, also dissents
from his brethren; and when we give each of these judges credit for
being able to appreciate the immense importance of _unanimity_ upon such
a case as the present, had it been practicable--can it seem really
unreasonable or surprising, that a corresponding difference of opinion
should exist among the peers, whose judicial