this judgment be allowed to have any weight in them, it goes the length
of declaring, that _every thing which has been decided in similar cases_
was mere error and delusion. Nothing can be more dangerous than such an
impression. I cannot conceive any thing more appalling than that it
should be held, that every one of the cases similarly decided ought to
be reversed; that the judgments without number under which parties have
been sent for execution _are all erroneous judgments, and ought to have
been reversed_, and _must_ have been reversed, if they had been brought
before the last resort!"

Lord Denman then rose; and though it was generally understood--as proved
to be the fact--that he intended to express a strong opinion against the
disallowance of the challenge to the array, we believe that no one
expected him to dissent upon the great and only point on which the
appeal turned, from the opinions of the great majority of his brother
judges, and from the Chancellor and Lord Brougham. We waited with great
interest to see the course which Lord Denman would take upon the great
question. He is a man of strong natural talents, of a lofty bearing in
the administration of justice, and an uncompromising determination on
all occasions to assert the rights and protect the privileges of the
subject. Nor, though a man of unquestionably very strong Whig opinions,
are we aware of his having ever allowed them to interfere with his
eminent and most responsible judicial duties. Whatever may be our
opinion as to the validity of his conclusions on the subject of the
challenge to the array, it was impossible not to be interested by the
zealous energy, the manly eloquence, with which he vindicated the right
of the subject to the fullest enjoyment of trial by jury, and denounced
what he considered to be any, the slightest interference, with that
right. At length his lordship closed his observations on that subject,
and amidst breathless silence, fell foul, not only of the two counts
which had been admitted to be defective--the sixth and seventh--but
"_many others of the counts!_" which, he said, were open to objection,
and declared that the judgment could not be sustained.

Lord Denman's judgment (to which great respect is due) was, as far as
relates to _the point_ of the case, to this effect:--He had an
"unconquerable repugnance" to assuming that the judges had passed
sentence on the good counts only; for it was in direct contradiction to