travel out
of the record. Now, what is the judgment? Why, 'that the court adjudges
the defendant, _for his offences aforesaid_, to be fined and
imprisoned.' What is an 'OFFENCE' on this record? There are two counts
defective: but why? Because they charged, according to the unanimous
opinion of the judges, NO offence. There were _facts_ stated, but not so
stated as to constitute an indictable offence. When you consider this
record, then, according to its language and legal interpretation, can
you say that when there is an award of judgment for the offences on the
record, that judgment applies to those counts which bear on the face of
them no offence whatever? That is, my lords, an incongruity, an
inconsistency, which your lordships will never sanction for one moment.
The argument which applies to defective counts, applies to valid counts
on which erroneous findings are entered up. When judgment is given for
an 'offence' on the record, it is given on the offence of which the
defendant is properly found guilty; and he is _not_ found guilty on
those counts on which the erroneous findings are entered up. My lords,
the conclusion to which I come on the record is, that when the judgment
is awarded 'for the offences aforesaid', it must be confined to those
offences stated on the record which are offences in the eye of the law,
and of which the defendant has been found guilty by the law--namely,
those offences on which the finding was properly made. It is not,
however, necessary to rest upon that: but if it were, I am of opinion,
and I state it to your lordships, that in this case, the record,
considered according to the proper and legal acceptation and force of
the terms--and that is the only way in which a local record can be
properly considered--must be taken as containing an award of judgment
for those offences only which are properly laid, and of which the
parties have been found guilty. On the face, therefore, of the record
itself, there is no defect whatever in this case."

His lordship, after a luminous commentary on a great number of
authorities, thus proceeded--"Now, my lords, it is said that there is
_no express decision_ upon the subject. Why, if a case be so clear, so
free from doubt, that no man, no attorney, barrister, or judge, ever
entertained any scruple concerning it--if the rule have been uniformly
acted upon and constantly recognised, is it to be said, that because
there is no express decision it is not to