unced them
insufficient, before hearing those numerous astute and able arguments
which have led the judges to that conclusion; and what if these had been
the _only_ counts, or one of them the sole count? Of course, justice
would have been defeated. Now the rule, custom, or practice--call it
what you will--which has been annulled by the House of Lords, was
admirably adapted to meet, in combination with the allowance of several
counts, the practical and perhaps inevitable difficulties which beset
the attempt to bring criminals to justice; to prevent any injurious
consequences from either _defective_ or _unproved_ counts; and we think
we may truly state, that no single instance as adduced during the
argument, of actual mischief or injury occasioned to defendants by the
operation of this rule--we believe we may safely defy any one now to
produce such a case. It is certainly possible for an anxious straining
ingenuity to _imagine_ such cases; and where is the rule of law, which,
in the infirmity of human institutions, cannot be shown capable of
occasioning _possible_ mischief and injustice?

One important distinction has not, we venture to think, been kept
constantly in view by the House of Lords in arriving at their recent
decision; we mean, the distinction between _defective_ counts and
_unproved_ counts. It was principally in the former case that the
annulled rule operated so advantageously for the interests of justice.
Let us suppose a case. A man is charged with an offence; and the
indictment contains three counts, which we will call A, B, C--each
differently describing the same offence. He is proved in court to have
actually done an act to which the law annexes a punishment, and a
general verdict and judgment, awarding the correct _kind_ of punishment,
are given and entered. If it afterwards became necessary to "make up"
the record--_i. e._ to enter the proceedings in due and full form--it
might appear that count A was essentially defective, as containing no
"offence" at all. But what did that signify--or what would it have
signified if count B had also been bad--provided count C was a good one,
and warranted the punishment which had been inflicted? The only
consequence was, that the indictment was a little longer than it turns
out that it needed to have been. Though several hooks had been used in
order to give an additional chance of catching the fish, that was not
regretted, when, the fish having been caught, it turn