accurate in his reasonings, and very tenacious in adhering to his
conclusions: possessing the advantage of several years' judicial
experience--as an equity judge. Thus he addressed himself to _the point_
of the case:--

"_Is there error upon the record?_"

* * * Did not the court below pass sentence upon the offences charged in
the _first_, _second_, _third_, _fourth_, _sixth_, and _seventh_ counts
in the indictment, as well as upon the offences charged in the other
counts? The record of that court tells us that it _did_; and if we are
to see whether there be any error on that record, and adopt the
unanimous opinion of the judges, that those six counts, or the findings
on them, are so bad that no judgment upon them would be good, how can we
give judgment for the defendant, and thereby declare that there is _no
error_ in the record? The answer which has been given to this objection
appears not only unsatisfactory, but inadmissible. It is said that we
must presume that the court below gave judgment, and passed sentence,
only with reference to the unobjectionable counts and findings. That
would be to presume that which the record negatives. By that record the
court tells us that the sentence on each defendant was 'for his offences
aforesaid,' after enumerating all those charged in the indictment. Are
we, after and in spite of this, to assume that this statement is false,
and that the sentence was upon one-half only of the offences charged? *
* * We can look to the record only for what passed in the court below;
and as that tells us the sentence was passed _upon all the offences of
which the jury had found the defendants guilty_, we cannot presume to
the contrary of such a statement. It would be the presumption of a fact,
the contrary of which was known to all to be the truth. The argument
supposes the court below to have been right in all particulars; but the
impossibility of doing so on this record was felt so strongly, that
another argument was resorted to, (not very consistently with the
judgment, for it assumes that the jury may have been wrong upon every
count but one,) namely, that a court of error has to see only that there
is _some one offence properly charged_, or a punishment applicable to it
inflicted; and then, that being so, that as to all the other counts the
court below was wrong--all such other counts or findings being bad.

"Consider what is the proposition contended for. Every count in an
indictment fo