escribed in different
manners in those counts. For whilst the record remains in that shape,
and unreversed, there can be no objection in point of law, that they
should be called 'offences' as they appear on the record."

Now, however, let us see the view taken of the matter by Mr Baron
Parke--a man undoubtedly of acute and powerful mind, as well as accurate
and extensive learning. It is impossible not to be struck by the tone of
diffidence which pervades his judgment; and it was _delivered_ in a very
subdued manner, not usual with that learned judge; occasioned doubtless
by the pain with which he found himself, on an occasion of such
transcendent importance, differing from all his brethren but one. He
commenced by acknowledging the astonishment with which he had heard
counsel at the bar question the proposition _which he_ (Baron Parke)
_had always considered_, ever since he had been in the profession,
_perfectly settled and well established_, viz. that in criminal cases
one good count, though associated with many bad ones, would,
nevertheless, suffice to support a general judgment. But "he had been
induced to _doubt_ whether the rule had not been carried too far, by a
misunderstanding of the _dicta_ of judges on applications _in arrest of
judgment_."

To enable the lay reader to appreciate the novel doctrine which has been
sanctioned in the present case, it is requisite to understand clearly
the distinction to which we have already briefly adverted, between a
motion in _arrest of judgment_ and a _writ of error_. When a defendant
has been found guilty of an offence by the verdict of a jury, judgment
must follow as a matter of course, "_judgment_ being the sentence of the
law pronounced by the court upon the matter contained in the
record."[11] If, however, the defendant can satisfy the court that the
indictment is entirely defective, he will succeed in "_arresting,_" or
staying the passing of judgment; but if he cannot, the court will
proceed to _give judgment_. That judgment having been entered on the
record, the defendant, if still persuaded that the indictment is
defective, and consequently the judgment given on it erroneous, has one
more chance; viz. to _reverse_ the judgment which has been so given, by
bringing a writ of error before an appellate tribunal. Now, the exact
proposition for which the traversers' counsel contended was this--that
the rule that "one good count will sustain a general judgment, though
ther