ould not come to pass, or should not be produced by him. But
this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about,
that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its
three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles;
or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is
absurd.
Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this
proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's
nature. I know that there are many who think that they can show,
that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature;
for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can
attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in
ourselves. Further, although they conceive God as actually
supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring
into existence everything which he actually understands, for they
think that they would thus destroy God's power. If, they
contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he
would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think,
would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to
asset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates
nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute
exercise of will, to create. However, I think I have shown
sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God's supreme
power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things--that is,
all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of
ways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way as
from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for
eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right
angles. Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from
all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state
of activity. This manner of treating the question attributes to
God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect. For,
otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an
infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able
to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would,
according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render
himself imperfect. Wherefore, in order to establish that God is
perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time,
that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power
extends; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd
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