in a
fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must
likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity. (I.
xxviii.) As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from
this common property of particular things, we have only a very
inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a
similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular
things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge
of the duration thereof. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that all particular things are
contingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate idea of
their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must
understand by the contingency and perishableness of things. (I.
xxxiii., Note i.) For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing
is contingent.

PROP. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God,
are true.

Proof.--All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with
their objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are
all true. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes
them to be called false.

Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive
mode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality
of falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II.
xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.).
Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to
be called false. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and
perfect, is true.

Proof.--When we say that an idea in us is adequate and
perfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea
is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the
essence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such
an idea is true. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge,
which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.

Proof.--There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them
to be called false (II. xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist in
simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to
be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for
ignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists in
the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or
confused ideas involve. Q.E.D.

Note.--In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists
in the privation o