possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal
essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.). Thus, however it be
conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by
which it should be conditioned to exist and act. Thus (Def.
vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or
constrained cause. Q.E.D.

Coroll. I.--Hence it follows, first, that God does not act
according to freedom of the will.

Coroll. II.--It follows, secondly, that will and intellect
stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and
rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be
conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular
manner. For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by
which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.
And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite
number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be
said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite
number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying
that motion and rest act by free will. Wherefore will no more
appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands
in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which
we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,
and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular
manner.

PROP. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by
God in any manner or in any order different from that which has
in fact obtained.

Proof--All things necessarily follow from the nature of God
(Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist
and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix.). If things, therefore,
could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned
to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have
been different, God's nature would also have been able to be
different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that
different nature also would have perforce existed, and
consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.
This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd. Therefore things
could not have been brought into being by God in any other
manner, &c. Q.E.D.

Note I.--As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at
noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things
contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall
attach to the word