2] of man.

[2] "Forma"

Proof.--The being of substance involves necessary existence
(Part i., Prop. vii.). If, therefore, the being of substance
appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man
would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,
consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd
(II. Ax. i.). Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which
it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same
nature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is
not that which constitutes the actual being of man. Again, the
proposition is evident from the other properties of
substance--namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,
immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the essence of man is
constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.
For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to
the essence of man. That essence therefore (by i. 15) is
something which is in God, and which without God can neither be
nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.),
or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned
manner.

Note.--Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
conceived without God. All men agree that God is the one and
only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their
existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in
respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect
to their being (secundum esse).

At the same time many assert, that that, without which a
thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that
thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God
appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created
things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more
probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think the
cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the
proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God, which
should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the
order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be
last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place
what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are
considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to
the divine nature, and, when afterwards th