ngs in infinite ways--that is, all things
which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.
Proof.--This proposition will be clear to everyone, who
remembers that from the given definition of any thing the
intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily
follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing
defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the
definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in
proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more
reality. Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite
attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite
essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its
nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which
can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must
necessarily follow. Q.E.D.
Corollary I.--Hence it follows, that God is the efficient
cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite
intellect.
Corollary II.--It also follows that God is a cause in himself,
and not through an accident of his nature.
Corollary III.--It follows, thirdly, that God is the
absolutely first cause.
PROP. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and
is not constrained by anyone.
Proof.--We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from
the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,
solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things
absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved
(in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived
but that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist;
outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to
act. Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,
and is not constrained by anyone. Q.E.D.
Corollary I.--It follows: 1. That there can be no cause
which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the
perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.
Corollary II.--It follows: 2. That God is the sole free
cause. For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature
(by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole
necessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the
sole free cause. Q.E.D.
Note.--Others think that God is a free cause, because he can,
as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have
said follow from his nature--that is, which are in his power,
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